The task of presenting for explicit view the store of appraisive terms our language affords has been undertaken in the conviction that it will be of interest not only to ethics and other philosophical studies but also to various areas of social science and linguistics. I have principally sought to do justice to the complexities of this vocabulary, the uses to which it is put, and the capacities its use reflects. I have given little thought to whether the inquiry was philosophical and whether it was being conducted in a philosophical manner. Foremost in my thoughts were the tasks that appeared to need doing, among them these: explicit attention was to be given to the vocabulary by means of which we say we commend,judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects and subject matters in our experience; it was to be segregated from other language at least for the purpose of study; the types of appraisive resources that are at hand in a language such as English were to be classified in some convincing and not too artificial manner; and an empirical standpoint was to be developed for a better view of appraisal, evaluation, and judging within the framework of other ways we have of responding to our surroundings such as appetition and emotion on one side and factual registering and theorizing about states of affairs on the other. Such an inquiry has never been undertaken in quite this manner before.