In his latest book the author of A Sharp Seasoning of Truth proposes a little known organizational system to be used by developing democratic nations to solve deep-rooted non-combat military problems centered on questions of loyalty or allegiance and civil-military relations, as well as the traditional problems of corruption, despotism, nepotism, mutiny, desertion, morale, and soldier-dependent social welfare needs. The basic concept of polwar originated with the Russian commissar system, giving the political cadre absolute control over the communist revolutionary armed forces, thus making them a decisive tool for the preservation of the communist party’s power. In 1924, the concept was introduced in China by Russian advisors, and later was revised and has been used to the present time by both the Communist Chinese and the Nationalists in forms modified to conform to their respective ideologies. In the late 1960s the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, attempted, unsuccessfully, to superimpose a polwar system, based upon the Chinese Nationalist model, in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It proved impossible to do this while the war continued to rage. Politano suggests that now, a U.N. agency could be established for teaching and assisting to institute polwar systems in the armed forces of developing nations at the host country’s request. And he states with conviction: “All they [the host nation], would have to do is ask for my assistance, and I’d go, as long as I still were able to provide it.”