Many US military operations since the end of the Cold War have ended improperly; the failure has not been due to a flaw in doctrine. Instead, senior civilian and military leaders have chosen to ignore or have neglected the complexities of termination. The US seemingly began Operating Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom with no apparent exit strategy. Senior US civilian and military leaders in the Bush Administration erroneously presumed that some other entity would assume responsibility for termination. Their decision was in direct conflict with doctrine, which clearly outlined the responsibility to plan for termination. Consequently, the United States was forced to assume responsibility for nation building. The research sought to explain why senior military or civilian leaders have neglected the specification of termination criteria. To provide the answer, it was necessary to explore four possible explanations. The first possible explanation is simply that military doctrine never addressed termination or that military theory neglected war termination. A second possible explanation was that both civilian and military leaders did not see termination as a responsibility of the US military. The next possibility was that the US did not intend to create a long-term commitment to the stability of a particular government. Lastly, the failure to define termination may have been simply a consequence of unforeseen unique circumstances. The research assessed US doctrine and operations in the pre-September 11, 2001 environment with post September 11, 2001 operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The object of the study was to review the lessons learned from earlier operations and determine if they were applied to planning for Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Operation Just Cause in 1989 and Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 were chosen because both operations focused on regime change. Termination for operations in Panama, although executed poorly, ended successfully. T